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ST. LOUIS LAW MISW
ACT OF GOD.
After an exhaustive review of the various definitions of
what is an "Act of God" as the phrase is used in legal ter-
minology and as laid down in multitudinous decisions, text
books, encyclopedias and the like, the writer of this article
finally ran across the following which struck him as being the
most comprehensive of the lot: "Any misadventure or cas-
ualty is said to be caused by the 'Act of God' when it happens
by the dr-ct, immediate and exclusive operation of the forces
of hatr-e, uncontrolled or uninfluenced by the power of man
and without human intervention, and is of such a character
that it could not be prevented or escaped from by any amount
of foresight or prudence, appliances which the situation of
the party might reasonably require him to use.'
Considering this definition from every possible angle, it
will not be found to be an impregnable criterion when applied
as a test to hypothetical states of facts or to states of facts
which have actually occurred, but'it will and does go a long
way towards reducing uncertainty to certainty and will, in the
absence of an absolute test, prove to be reasonably safe and
reliable.
As a mere abstraction, it may not appear to the reader as
being particularly helpful in determining vexed "twilight"
questions that arise under this phrase, but a careful analysis
of it will reveal far more than would occur to him upon just a
casual reading.
"Acts of God," as the term is used in its legal sense (I
shall use it in no other sense in this article) and as it is used
in the foregoing definition divide themselves naturally into
four classes, which may be stated as follows:
(1) Any event occurring through the medium of the forces
of nature which has never before occurred in the history of
mankind.
1. New Brunswick Transfer Co. v. Tiers, 24 N. J. Law, 714.
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T2) Any force of nature which though it may be of com-
mon occurrence on other parts of the earth's surface, has
never before been known or expected to occur at some place
-where it does suddenly occur.
(3) Any force of nature which, though active to a certain
degree at various intervals of time, suddenly or without warn-
ing assumes a severity theretofore unknown.
(4) Any force of nature which has been known to occur
before within a particular area, but at such rare intervals as
not to be reasonably expected at or within the time when it
does occur.
It was with a great deal of hesitation that sudden sickness
and death were omitted from the foregoing or as a fifth class,
but, although there are many contrary decisions, sickness and
death in themselves even though occurring unexpectedly are
more in line with "ordinary" events than otherwise. Sickness
and death, though brought about by most unusual circum-
stances, are after all merely effects produced by some cause,
and, as a matter of fact, what we are examining when we an-
alyze an "Act of God" is cause. True, a person may sud-
denly be laid low by a heart or heat stroke, apoplexy or what
not, but are these not common occurrences and would it not be
stretching the phrase somewhat to say that they were acts
of God? We could no doubt think of cases where the cause of
the sudden demise was an act of God, but in these cases the
cause itself would fall naturally into one of the four classes of
eases laid down above.
These four classes could, with a reasonable degree of safety
be used as a major premise of a syllogism, applying the par-
ticular state of facts at hand as the minor premise. If the
minor premise failed to conform to the major premise, of
course, the conclusion that a particular state of facts used
constituted an Act of God would not follow.
It will be noticed by the reader as he passes from the first
to the fourth subdivision that it becomes increasingly difficult
to determine just what state or states of facts will fall under
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the particular class, no particular difficulty being found with
the first two; they being of such rare occurrence as to suggest
immediately some world-wide calamity or the like.
Under the first class would fall possibly a sudden shifting-
of the earth's axis, causing chaotic climatic conditions, a large
heavenly body being brought suddenly to the surface of the
earth and devastating a large area, and, in fact, most anything-
that would be contrary to established laws of nature.
Occurrences coming within the second subdivision are, like
the first, easily recognized. Thus, an innocent lookin moun-
tain in a non-volcanic region suddenly blowing its top off and
becomin- an active volcano, zero weather in the torrid zone,
earthquakes, a cyclone in a region where even mild thunder or
windstorms are of rare happening and numerous other oc-
currences of like kind which can be left to the reader's imag-
ination.
The third subdivision presents a slightly difficult problem
as compared with the first and second and will necessarily in-
volve a little more careful treatment. Examples of this class
might well be illustrated by such events as an unprecedented
flood in a river valley where the stream was accustomed to
overflow its banks at certain periods of the year, a cyclone in
a region where ordinary thunder and windstorms are fairly
frequent in their visitations, a tidal wave where theretofore
only the ordinary going and coming of the tide has occurred,
and other like instances which must, however, be chosen with
care.
With regard to the illustrations in the preceding para-
graph, particularly the first one, it may at first be objected that
it does not take into consideration the fact that time may be
available within which an individual might be able to prepare
for and ward off the injury to goods or chattels resulting by
reason of such flood or other happening. This objection will
be found to be without merit when the restrictive matter "sud-
denly or without warning" is taken for just what it implies.
It will be noticed that they are incorporat2d in the disjunctive
rather than in the conjunctive, and this becauF "suddenly"
126
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is relative, whereas "without warning" is absolute. "Sud-
denly" then inferentially makes provision for reasonable time
for avoidance of consequences and, if the occurrence were
"without warning" it would necessarily mean that no time
for avoidance intervened.
Now, when we come to consider the last division, we have
a real problem on hand; one that has vexed the courts for a
long time past and one which must be approached and han-
dled with a large degree of caution. It cannot be disposed of
in a few words, if at all. Having framed the definition in an
endeavor to establish a fairly workable rule, one which the
courts have been struggling to express, but have either stated
too broadly or not broadly enough, it is in order to make an
effort to apply it to facts.
Just what classes of facts will fall under this subdivision'?
The question might better be, "Excluding those coming un-
der the first three subdivisions, just what classes of facts will
not fall under this one? It is a heterogeneous mass indeed,
anything from the death of an individual by lightning to a
deluge might properly be included. It may even seem to over-
lap to some extent the preceding subdivision.
It has been made flexible and possesses the strange feature
that what may be an act of God in one instance will not be so
in another. This is true by reason of the phrase "at or within
the time." To say of two effects brought about by the identi-
cal act or force of nature, one is an act of God and the other
is not may sound like a paradox, but nevertheless such may be
the case.
By way of illustration, in a certain southern city where
there were moderately cold winters, an unusually severe cold
spell caused some water mains to burst, great damage result-
ing to a number of the neighboring inhabitants. An action fol-
lowed based upon negligence against the water company on
these facts. The plaintiff proved that these unusually severe
cold spells had occurred before but at periods ranging any-
where between twenty and thirty years apart. The defendant
proved at the trial that the water mains were buried deep
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol8/iss2/7
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
enough and were of material strong enough to withstand ordi-
nary cold weather such as generally prevailed in that vicinity.
On these facts the defendant was awarded judgment. In an
almost identical case further east in about the same latitude,
the plaintiff recovered judgment, the Court holding in this
case that it was not an act of God. Applying our premise, the
writer is of the opinion that the latter decision was correct.
In the same jurisdiction where the first case was tried, it was
held that two wagon loads of potatoes destroyed by the same
cold spell were destroyed by an act of God. Applying our
premise here, we are forced to the conclusion that this deci-
sion was correct.
Now, assuming that the first decision were as the second,
we would have one act of nature constituting an Act of God
in the matter of the potatoes and not an Act of God in the
cases of the water mains bursting, and this in the same juris-
diction which would not, under the circumstances, have been
illogical. The reason is obvious; in both cases it is necessary
to take into consideration the nature of the article and the
length of time it would be exposed to the elements.
In conclusion, it may all be summed up thus: "What, un-
der all the circumstances of the particular case involved,
would have been anticipated by the reasonably prudent man ?"
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